Hegel and intrrsubjective subjectivity

Abstract

Kant argued that in order to bring about validity for knowledge we have to make a paradigm shift. The paradigm shift which was well known as copernican revolution was based on this assumption that the one who observing could be able to determinate objects. For Kant subject as observer has the ability to determine the world transcendentally. For Hegel the Kantian paradigm shift count as subjetivising the objectivity. He blames Kant for not seeing this basic fact that, subject himself become in the objectivity and the relation could not be as Kant was assuming. Hegel by replacing the transcendental I with Giest attempts to instead of making objectivity, subjective, do the reverse. In this article we argue that by objectivizing the subjectivity, Hegel not inly became able to overcome the problems posed by Kantian philosophy but also assumes subjectivity as intrinsically intersubjective