Sophia Perennis (Jāvīdān Khirad)

I attempt to explain the systematic position of the Divine in Heidegger’s thought in relation with ontological difference and the initial origin of Phenomenology. For this purpose, the dichotomy must be overcome, which Heidegger considers between metaphysical God and divine God. On one side, Heidegger’s conception of metaphysical God is essentially related to the aristotelian conception of ‘arche’ as highest being; and thus, it doesn't embrace the negative approach to ‘arche’. On the other side, Heidegger's attempt for the expression of appearance of God entangles himself in a fideism which has no relation with ontological difference; therefore it contradicts the criteria of his own thinking. The criticism of these two approaches, creates the necessity of a more fundamental understanding of the Divine according to ontological difference in an implicit reference to Platonic ‘arche beyond Being’ in the sense of a negative understanding of ‘arche’ as concealment, absence and nothingness.

Hegel's logic has been interpreted in different ways so far, generally divided into two types: metaphysical and non-metaphysical encounters. In this article, based on what Hegel himself says about his logic and his intended purpose, we will first try to elucidate Hegel's goal in that part of his philosophical system. Then we will try to explain the interpretative standpoints of two of the most prominent Hegel scholars, namely Robert Pippin and Stephen Houlgate, and elucidate the differences between these two interpretative approaches to find out what is it that separates their approaches toward Hegel`s logic. Finally, relying on Hegel's insistence on systematic thinking, and the relation between the Phenomenology of Spirit and Logic as the first two major parts of his system, we will try to show which interpretive approach can clarify Hegel's philosophical project as a whole better.

The distinction between propositional and objectual understanding is one among others pertaining to understanding. While the object of the former is a fact, the object of the latter is a theory, a system, an entity, a concept, a model, a property, or a collection of phenomena. The question at issue, however, is how these two kinds of understanding are related. Specifically, is the latter reducible to the former? Or is objectual understanding more than and above propositional understanding? In this article, I will first introduce and elaborate on some accounts that support some sort of anti-reductionism. I will then engage with one of the most detailed critiques against anti-reductionism, i.e. Kareem Khalifa’s one, and evaluate its scope of validity. After proposing an account of understanding in which scientific representation plays a key role, I discuss, finally, whether the reductionism within this account is tenable.

The Cartesian frame of mind, which is dominant in philosophy and the new age, introduces man not as a soul, but as a thinking essence. In this view, the essence of man in contrast to his body is the mind, in which the various characteristics of the Aristotelian soul, such as passivities, will, reasoning, and theoretical and practical reflections, are all referred to. But Aristotle's idea in defining the soul, that is, the logos that observes (belongs to) the body, was accepted and continued in Islamic philosophy. The current research, paying attention to the difference between the mind in the thought of contemporary Western philosophy and the soul in the thought of Muslim philosophers, aims to provide a preliminary formulation of the conceptual distinction between the mind and the concept with the soul by logical analysis and examining the views of Sadrul Matalhin.

One of the neglected works of Avicenna in understanding her intellectual and philosophical system is his comments on the ethology attributed to Aristotle. These essays, which are written in a scattered manner on the topics of ethology, include various topics of theology, psychology, minds and the first principles, the perception of the truth of the first origin and many other issues. The important axes of the Sheikh's attention in these essays are the first psychology and the other connection of the soul with the first principle. In the psychology axis, in addition to the explanation, Sheikh's comments also have a critical aspect, and in particular, he does not accept the existence of the soul before the creation of the body, or the availability of perceptions and knowledge before the connection with the body.

This article treats how the humanities return historically to Renaissance Humanism and "studia humnitas" in a Heideggerian existential-hermeneutical analyses. As historical phenomena they are funded on existence of humanists: the crisis from the late middle ages put them in danger of destruction, that necessitates them to put anew "question of beings as such in generally" and seeks their own position in the middle of beings, in order to reconstruct afresh his mind, knowledge and its disciplines. Also, it will be explained the various discipline of humanities as existential mode of humanists, but in their historical actuality. The same ontological exposition and the new understanding of beings will be meant heir as hermeneutics. Afterwards means hermeneutics classically i. e. text interpretation. Studia humanitas was based on antique texts, therefore the old languages and classical philology. Various aspects of humanistic textuality will be pointed heir too.

Self-awareness, that is, a person's direct awareness of his own self, which Avicenna relied on in his Flying Man Argument to prove the soul, is the result of the activity of which perceptual faculty in a person? Avicenna's words about this issue are ambiguous and complicated: Sometimes he considers intellect as the perceiver of the self and therefore calls it an intellectual knowledge, and sometimes he considers the soul as its perceiver and calls it an inherent and natural knowledge. In order to remove this ambiguity from Avicenna's words and reach his final answer to this question, in this article, we have analyzed his words - especially in the book of Mubahathat which has discussed this issue in more detail than in other places - with a descriptive, analytical and critical method, and we have come to the conclusion that in Avicenna's final view, the perceptual faculty that is responsible for self-awareness, is not any of the faculties of the soul, but the soul itself is the perceiver of its own essence. But since he often presented the discussion of self-awareness in the framework of his theory about perceptual faculties, sometimes he called it intellection, and in fact, he used ‘intellect’ or intellection in two senses.

The current investigation tries to answer two questions about Metaphysics: a) Is metaphysics a science about general principles of beings, or does it ask concretely about some special beings? b) Is metaphysics in its Kantian conception, a complete rupture from Aristotelian Metaphysics,? To answer these questions, in response to the first question it is shown that the problem of metaphysics begins with the question of the general principles of beings. However, this question leads to the question of special being, i.e., the unconditioned (thinking of thinking). Therefore, the knowledge of general principles of beings is the same as the knowledge of supreme beings. After explaining the nature of Aristotelian metaphysics, by examining Kant's texts, it turns out that, contrary to the popular belief, Kant's explanation of beings is always tied to the question of the unconditioned. Therefore, according to Aristotle and Kant, metaphysics is always connected with the unconditioned.